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A SEQUEL TO CHAPTER X OR CHAPTER XI:




THE practicing lawyer, confronted with the problem of reorganizing
an insolvent debtor, finds that the Bankruptcy Act offers his client
a choice of two proceedings, namely, Chapter X1 or Chapter XI.2 In a
previous article,3 the history of these chapters and some of their salient
features were discussed.
The choice of chapters is not a difficult one in the everyday type of
close corporation which ostensibly desires to effectuate an arrangement
with its unsecured creditors and has no securities outstanding to the
public. This corporation would choose the Chapter XI proceeding. On
the other hand, the open corporation with securities outstanding in the
hands of the public will seek relief under Chapter X. But the middle-
sized corporation 4 having a small'issue of stock outstanding to the public
and having unsecured liabilities of two to three million dollars, may
find difficulty in adjusting its unsecured liabilities in Chapter X.
As indicated in the original article, the debtors in the principal cases5
filed petitions under Chapter XI seeking only to adjust their unsecured
liabilities, leaving their stock holdings unaffected and preferring the
simpler and more expeditious procedure of Chapter XI. The Securities
and Exchange Commission, however, has generally taken the position
in these borderline cases that the Chapter XI proceeding is inadequate
and that the proceeding should be transferred to Chapter X or be dis-
missed, contending that the public interest involved requires a Chapter
X trustee's supervision, investigatory processes and recommendations.
It must not be overlooked that the determination of whether a debtor
is properly within Chapter X or Chapter XI can take place in either
proceeding. For example, assume that a debtor files a petition under
Chapter X. The debtor must, among other things, state in its petition
* The authors are members of the firm of Levin & Weintraub, New York City.
1. Bankruptcy Act §§ 101-276 (1956), 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 501-676 (1946, Supp, 1956),
2. Bankruptcy Act §§ 301-99 (1956), 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 701-99 (1946, Supp. 1956).
3. Weintraub, Levin and Novick, Chapter X or Chapter XI: Coexistence for the Middle-
Sized Corporation, 24 Fordham L. Rev. 616 (1956).
4. Cf., e.g., General Stores Corp. v. Shlensky, 350 U.S. 462 (1956); SEC v. Liberty
Baking Corp., 240 F.2d 511 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 930 (1957); SEC v.
Wilcox-Gay Corp., 231 F.2d 859 (6th Cir. 1956); In re Transvision, Inc., 217 F.2d 243
(2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 952 (1955).
5. See note 4 supra.
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"why adequate relief cannot be obtained under chapter XI.G'3 Any
party in interest, as set forth in the Act,1 may interpose an answer to
this petition and the judge, having supervision of the proceeding, will
hear and determine the issue shortly after the filing of the petition8 If
he finds adequate relief can be obtained under Chapter X, he will
approve the petition as having been filed in good faith. Otherwise, he
will direct a dismissal or a transfer to Chapter XI.
Under Chapter XI the procedure is different. When the debtor files
its petition no allegation as to the adequacy of relief under Chapter XI
is necessary. The judge usually refers the Chapter M" proceeding to a
referee in bankruptcy who then supervises the arrangement proceeding.
Any party in interest, who feels that the proceeding should be under
Chapter X because relief under Chapter XI is inadequate, may then
make application to the district judge for an order dismissing the proceed-
ing.'O The judge will then make a determination upon the facts before
him whether the proceeding should be transferred to Chapter X.
The latter procedure is by far the more common, for the reason that
a debtor's choice of Chapter X is seldom challenged, whereas, its choice
of Chapter XI is subject to the constant surveillance of the Securities
and Exchange Commission. Assuming, therefore, that application has
been made to transfer the proceeding from Chapter XI to Chapter X,
the primary factors necessary to show the basis for relief for a transfer
of the proceeding are virtually the same (even though different in
degree) as are necessary to confirm a reorganization under Chapter X.
Thus, in order to confirm a plan of reorganization, it must be shown that
the plan is fair, equitable and feasible.' - This is so even though the fair
and equitable requisite has been eliminated from Chapter X.' 3 Thus,
in SEC v. Liberty Baking Corp., the court of appeals commented:
"We might assume, arguendo, that, if a plan is properly within Chapter XI, it need
no longer measure up to that standard [fair and equitable] ...or to anything
equivalent. Even so, in determining whether a proceeding properly comes within
that Chapter, it is necessary, of course, to determine, among other things, whether
the proposed arrangement contains features which bring it within Chapter X where
the 'fair-and-equitable' standard is applicable and where alone the facts relevant
thereto will be fully investigated."'14
6. Bankruptcy Act § 130(7) (1956), 11 US.C.A. § 530(7) (1946).
7. Bankruptcy Act § 137 (1956), 11 U.S.C.A. § 537 (1946).
8. Bankruptcy Act §§ 141-44 (1956), 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 541-44 (1946).
9. Bankruptcy Act § 147 (1956), 11 U.S.C.A. § 547 (1946).
10. Bankruptcy Act § 323, 11 U.S.C.A. § 72S (Supp. 1956).
11. Ibid.
12. See, e.g., Bankruptcy Act §§ 221(2)-(3) (1956), 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 621(2)-(3) (1945).
13. See, e.g., Bankruptcy Act § 366 (1956), 11 U.S.C.A. § 766 (Supp. 1956); and
former subsection 3, eliminated by 66 Stat. 433 (1952).
14. 240 F.2d 511, 515 nab (2d Cir. 1957).
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Therefore, in discussing the plan of arrangement of the Liberty case in
the Chapter XI proceeding, the court of appeals considered ".... whether
the plan would deprive creditors of their 'absolute priority' rights as
against stockholders .... ,,'> Again, the court considered whether loans
made by management would rank subordinate to the claims of creditors
on principles established in corporate reorganization proceedings."0
The court, in effect, reexamined the Chapter XI proceeding at the
threshold to determine whether it was properly instituted under Chapter
XI, not on the basis of Chapter XI standards or requirements for relief,1 7
but on an analysis of whether the Chapter XI plan matched up to Chap-
ter X standards.
This problem has been the subject of much litigation. Recent decisions
by higher courts in three of the cases discussed in our original article
suggest further comment. 8 Our original thesis, that a determination of
whether a corporation should be within Chapter X or Chapter XI was a
problem which could not be determined by mechanical rule, but was
dependent upon numerous variable factors, was again reiterated by the
courts. This determination, as was indicated at that time, would depend
upon such considerations as:
".. . assets, liabilities, stock outstanding to the public, intricacy of corporate struc-
ture, need for investigation, and management's contribution, all properly evaluated
by the exercise of judicial discretion."'19
It is interesting to note that in General Stores Corp. v. Shlensky,
SEC v. Wilcox-Gay Corp., and the Liberty case,"° the higher courts sub-
stantially adopted this reasoning. Following these principles, it was held
in the General Stores and Liberty cases that the proceedings belonged
under Chapter X; and in the Wilcox-Gay case that the proceeding
belonged under Chapter XI.
THE GENERAL STORES CASE
In the General Stores case the Supreme Court was divided on the
question of whether the debtor should be allowed to continue its Chapter
XI proceeding. Both the district court and the court of appeals had
concluded that the debtor was not properly within Chapter XI and
that the proceeding should be transferred to Chapter X. Mr. Justice
15. Id. at 515.
16. Id. at 515, citing Taylor v. Standard Gas & Elec. Co., 306 U.S. 307 (1939); cf.
Consolidated Rock Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510, 523-24 (1941); Pepper v. Litton, 308
U.S. 295 (1939).
17. See, e.g., Bankruptcy Act § 366 (1956), 11 U.S.C.A. § 766 (1946).
18. General Stores Corp. v. Shlensky, 350 U.S. 462 (1956); SEC v. Wilcox-Gay Corp.,
231 F.2d 859 (6th Cir. 1956); SEC v. Liberty Baking Corp., 240 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1957).
19. Weintraub, Levin and Novick, supra note 3, at 633.
20. See note 18 supra.
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Douglas, writing for the majority, affirmed. His holding was based, as
were all prior decisions of the court of appeals, upon an analysis made in
SEC v. United States Realty and Improvement Co. "1 He indicated that
a choice as to the propriety of the chapters would be dependent upon the
needs dictated by the particular facts of each case, that is, whether the
formulation of a plan under Chapter XI by the debtor or the formulation
of a plan by disinterested trustees as provided by Chapter X "would
better serve the 'public and private interests concerned, including those
of the debtor.' ,,2
New terminology now appears in the analysis made in the United
States Realty case. The needs of the particular proceeding are the dis-
cretionary guides for the lower courts. These needs, the Supreme Court
held, are substantially the factors which have been outlined above:
(1) readjustment of debts of an insolvent debtor without sacrifice by
the stockholders may violate the principle requiring a plan to be fair and
equitable as enunciated in Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Co., (2) stand-
ing alone, readjustment of the debt structure may be inadequate unless
there is an accounting by management for the causes of insolvency;
(3) readjustment without new management may not be feasible; (4)
other needs equally compelling in nature and which may depend on the
factors of each case, are to be considered.
Applying these needs to the Genewral Stores case, the Court found that
there had already been one reorganization; heavy short-term loans were
pressing; the company had been changed from an operating company to
a holding company; shares of stock of the subsidiaries, a most valuable
asset, had been pledged; the plan was not feasible because it did not in-
clude a merger of the parent with the subsidiaries; a funding of un-
secured debts, "and a realignment of debt and stock so as to give a
balanced capital structure, 112 4 did not exist; and, finally, the new business
had "been launched with heavy borrowings on a short-term basis.1"
Moreover, the evaluation of these needs was to be made by the lower
courts. Their discretion was the catalyst which fused the various ele-
ments or factors. Here, again, the Supreme Court emphasized the func-
tion the lower courts played in a determination of the propriety of cbap-
ters by the use of their discretion:
"We could reverse [the lower courts] ... only if their exercise of discretion
transcended the allowable bounds. We cannot say that it does" ' -0
21. 310 U.S. 434 (1940), reversing 10S F.2d 794 (2d Cir. 1940).
22. General Stores Corp. v. Shlensky, 350 US. 462, 465 (1956).
23. 30 U.S. 106 (1939).





The "allowable bounds" are, of course, the needs or factors which
have been discussed. Furthermore, in itemizing the needs which would
be determinative, no attempt was made by the Court to set up a com-
plete list or draw a fine line of demarcation. Those that were itemized
by the Court were only examples of some of the needs to be considered
and did not foreclose the use of other guides. The Court made it clear
that the enumerated needs were only some of the "typical instances
where c. X affords a more adequate remedy than c. XJ.' ' 0"T
One of the two startling features of the majority opinion was its con-
clusion that the character of the debtor, that is, that it had public
security holders, was not a controlling consideration in the choice of
chapters. The Commission on the other hand, argued, as it had in the
United States Realty case, that the character of the debtor, the nature
of its capital structure, and the fact that its securities were publicly held,
necessitated a finding that Chapter X was the only haven for the debtor.
The Court rejected this argument and observed:
"A large company with publicly held securities may have as much need for a simple
composition of unsecured debts as a smaller company. And there is no reason we
can see why c. XI may not serve that end. The essential difference is not between
the small company and the large company but the needs to be served."28
Furthermore, in our previous article, the fact was emphasized that
size was not a determinative factor, and that many corporations with
larger assets and liabilities than the debtors possessed either in 'the
General Stores or United States Realty cases had availed themselves of
Chapter XI. The object which these debtors sought was an extension or
composition of their unsecured obligations. However, as the Court de-
termined in the General Stores case, the needs of each case would de-
termine the choice of chapters. Thus, in the General Stores case, the
Supreme Court held the needs necessitated a finding that the case was
improperly instituted under Chapter XI.
Consistent with the interpretation of the United States Realty case,
the dissent written by Justice Frankfurter was also based upon an
inquiry as to whether the district court had overstepped the bounds of
discretion. Justice Frankfurter indicated that the exercise of this discre-
tion was based upon an erroneous application by the district court of
principles which had been enunciated in the United States Realty case,
and was in disregard of the 1952 amendment to section 366 of Chapter
XI, eliminating the fair and equitable requisite. 9 The elimination of this
requisite made it possible for a debtor to file an arrangement in a Chap-
27. Id. at 467.
28. Id. at 466.
29. 66 Stat. 433 (1952).
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ter XI proceeding where the purpose was to leave unaffected the position
of the stockholders. Since, the dissent continued, the United States
Realty case in a small degree turned upon the fact that the application
of the fair and equitable clause was a necessary element of the confirma-
tion of a proceeding under Chapter XI, there was error by the lower
courts in not considering its elimination.
Justice Frankfurter emphasized the fact that no consideration was
given in the majority opinion to the "significance of this amendment by
Congress."5 0 Discussing the exercise of the discretion by the district
court, he indicated that the basis of all discretion must of necessity
depend upon standards. Moreover, in his opinion, the "needs" which the
majority found so compelling to sustain the discretion of the district
court were overemphasized at the expense of others, which, if adopted,
would swing the pendulum in favor of the applicability of Chapter XI.
Thus, he observed that the majority opinion failed to give proper weight
to the "informal, efficient and economical procedure" 3' involved
in a Chapter XI proceeding, particularly where there was no change in
the capital structure involved; to the fact that no impropriety in cor-
porate management had been shown to exist; and to the fact that
creditors' approval of the arrangement indicated that it was in their best
interests.
The second startling feature of the opinion is that for the first time
since the United States Realty case, the "fair and equitable" doctrine,
as a criterion for a determination of the propriety of the chapters, was
relegated to a secondary position, the Supreme Court inserting as a
primary criterion a determination as to whether the Chapter XI plan
was "feasible." It must be remembered that in the General Stores case
unsecured creditors were being offered forty per cent of their claims
instead of one hundred per cent. This settlement would not have consti-
tuted full priority if the "fair and equitable" doctrine was applied. Not-
withstanding this plan of forty per cent and this preemption of priority,
the Supreme Court held that this factor was not the controlling con-
sideration:
"A question as to what is 'fair and equitable' between creditors and stockholders
may eventually be reached in the reorganization. But the paramount issue at pre-ent
concerns what is 'feasible.' ")32
Thus, the Supreme Court left the determination of the amount of the
settlement between the stockholders and the creditors of the debtor open
for future consideration. Moreover, a reduction in the claims of un-
30. General Stores Corp. v. Shlensky, 350 U.S. 462, 472 (1956).
31. Id. at 471.
32. Id. at 467.
1957]
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secured creditors was held not to be a vital factor in the determination
of the propriety of the chapters even though the unsecured creditors
had a superior position to the stockholders whose stock position was not
being affected. Indeed, in the Wilcox-Gay case, the plan provided for a
reduction of the claims of creditors to fifty per cent of their face amount
without any corresponding reduction or elimination of the stock. Never-
theless, the plan was not rejected as being unfair and inequitable. More-
over, even though in the Transvision 3 case the claims of creditors were
not reduced, they were extended over a period of time which for all
practical purposes affected prompt payment and preempted priority by
stockholders.
This seeming departure by the courts from the application of the
"fair and equitable" doctrine in determining the propriety of the chap-
ters was arrested, however, in the Liberty case, where the court held
that only within a Chapter X proceeding could it be determined whether
"the plan is fair and equitable as well as feasible."34
THE WiLcox-GAY CASE
Turning now to the Wilcox-Gay case, it will be recalled that the
district court denied the application by the Securities Exchange Com-
mission to transfer the Chapter XI proceeding to Chapter X pursuant
to the provisions of section 328 of the Bankruptcy Act. The Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit unanimously affirmed this decision. The
court frankly stated that it had withheld its decision until the determina-
tion of the Supreme Court in the General Stores case. Having analyzed
this decision, the court stated that the ". . . discussion by Mr. Justice
Douglas [in the General Stores case] indicates that the district court
in this case [the Wilcox-Gay case] applied appropriate considerations
and was privileged to exercise-as in our judgment he did-sound discre-
tion in this matter.""5 The court noted that the district court had relied
upon the decision of the Transvision case and had followed this decision
in its assertion that the determination of the proper chapter was within
the sound discretion of the district court, and that unless this discretion
had been abused, its determination should be sustained.
The court of appeals then proceeded to analyze the basis of this discre-
tion and indicated that the district court's disposition of the case was
based upon the following factors, among others: the plan was feasible;
there was a reasonable likelihood of rehabilitation of the debtor; the
stockholders' interest could only be beneficial in the event continued
33. In re Transvision, Inc., 217 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 952 (1955).
34. 240 F.2d at 516.
35. SEC v. Wilcox-Gay Corp., 231 F.2d 859, 860 (6th Cir. 1956).
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operations were profitable; creditors contended that existing manage-
ment was necessary for the continuation of the business; an opportunity
was open at all times for interested parties to call any irregularities to
the attention of the court; the transfer to Chapter X might be prejudicial
to the ultimate success of the proposed plan and was not necessary; there
was no public interest as distinguished from public ownership, which
required the intervention of the Commission; further investigation was
unnecessary in view of the activities of the various interests, including
a creditors' committee.
The court of appeals concluded its decision in the Wilcox-Gay case by
indicating that the considerations which had actuated the exercise of
discretion by the district court in allowing the proceeding to remain
within Chapter XI were in harmony with the principles set forth by the
Supreme Court in the General Stores case. It observed that the Supreme
Court in the General Stores case had indicated that the lower courts had
reasonably concluded that the debtor in that case "needed a more per-
vasive reorganization than is available under c. XI."' ,^ However, there
was nothing in the opinion of the Supreme Court in the General Stores
case that would indicate that an application of the principles therein set
forth would require reversal in the Wilcox-Gay case. On the contrary,
the court of appeals continued, the exercise of the district court's discre-
tion was within the allowable bounds as later set forth by the Supreme
Court in the General Stores case.
Trm LMERTY CASE
In the Liberty case, as in the Wilcox-Gay case, the district court had
held the proceeding was properly within Chapter XI. Nevertheless,
while in the Wilcox-Gay case, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
upheld the district court's exercise of discretion as sound and in accord
with the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in the General Stores
case, in the Liberty case the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
reversed the district court, emphasizing that the district court's decision
antedated the decision of the Supreme Court in the General Stores case.
The Second Circuit distinguished the Wilcox-Gay and Liberty cases
by indicating among other things that the Wilcox-Gay case had original-
ly been a Chapter X proceeding and that its decision rested "... on the
ground that the analytical procedures available under Chapter X had
in fact been carried out.... ."' This comparison appears to be based on
a fallacious assumption, namely, that since the debtor had previously
undergone Chapter X proceedings, it had been subjected to some cor-
rective treatment and Chapter XI therefore was available to it. The
36. 350 US. at 46S.
37. 240 F.2d at 516 n.10.
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assumption overlooked the fact that no plan was presented in the Chap-
ter X proceeding and also that Chapter XI has no provision for an
active trustee who has powers similar to that of a Chapter X trustee s
The transfer to Chapter XI left the debtor without the aid of the func-
tional activity of a trustee, and the comparison is an analogy with a
sound difference.
Another alleged distinguishing feature between the Wilcox-Gay and
Transvision cases on the one hand, and the Liberty case on the other,
lay in the fact that the plans of the former would affect trade and com-
mercial creditors, whereas the plan of the Liberty case would affect
public debenture holders. These debenture holders were nothing more
than unsecured creditors and such distinction between public and private
unsecured creditors is not sound. Both the public debenture holders
and the private trade creditors are unsecured; both can be equally
affected in a Chapter XI proceeding. 0 Nowhere under either Chapter X
or Chapter XI is there provided preferential treatment for public un-
secured creditors as against private unsecured creditors. Indeed, the
Supreme Court in the General Stores case discussed public and private
interests and dealt with " 'the public and private interests concerned' 1141
as if they were on an equal plane.
As for the district court's exercise of its discretion, the court of appeals
in the Liberty case stated that it "overlooked the very narrow scope of
Chapter XI."'1 There was very little left for Liberty Baking Corpora-
tion to do but to comply with the provisions of section 328 of the Bank-
ruptcy Act42 and file an amended petition under Chapter X.41
CONCLUSION
The seeming inconsistency of evaluating Chapter XI proceedings by
Chapter X standards was perceived by the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, for in the Liberty case, the court did state:
"Conceivably, under Chapter XI proceedings, a plan of arrangement might be
presented which would unmistakably satisfy the requirements of Chapter X and
would be as favorable to the creditors as what they could obtain under Chapter X.
In such exceptional circumstances, we might not disturb the arrangement merely
because it had been reached by Chapter XI proceedings." 44
It is difficult to see how a plan of arrangement under Chapter XI
could fulfill the requisites of Chapter X and be as favorable in result
38. See Bankruptcy Act § 338 (1956), 11 U.S.C.A. § 738 (1946); and compare with
Bankruptcy Act §§ 167-69 (1956), 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 467-69 (1946).
39. Bankruptcy Act § 306(1) (1956), 11 U.S.C.A. § 706(1) (1946).
40. 350 U.S. at 465.
41. 240 F.2d at 516.
42. 11 U.S.C.A. § 728 (Supp. 1956).
43. Bankruptcy Docket No. 91173 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
44. 240 F.2d at 516.
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to creditors as a Chapter X proceeding, for while the fair and equitable
doctrine is applicable under Chapter X, there would be other standards
under Chapter XI, namely, the retention of stockholdings and modifica-
tion of creditors' interests.45
Actually this line of demarcation between Chapter X and Chapter XI
should receive more practical application. The borderline case, that is,
the middle-sized corporation, depends to a great extent upon manage-
ment for its success in operation. To relegate management to a sub-
ordinate position and to overrule the negotiations between the debtor and
a majority of its creditors, as was done in the Liberty case, may result
in doubtful future advantages under Chapter X, particularly where
management plays an important role in the debtor's operations. These
debtors, as the facts certainly show in the Wilcox-Gay, Transvision,
General Stores and Liberty cases, appear to be closer in general adapta-
bility to a Chapter -I proceeding than to a Chapter X proceeding.
Indeed, the history of the General Stores cas&ll under Chapter X
indicates at the time of this publication that the plan of reorganization
proposed by the trustee provides for a settlement with unsecured credi-
tors of forty per cent in cash or corporate stock or an alternative of one
hundred per cent over seven years.47 This settlement of forty per cent in
cash is substantially the plan offered to unsecured creditors in the
Chapter XI proceeding of the General Stores case. The transfer to
Chapter X has, therefore, apparently resulted in no change of plan or
alteration of the rights of secured creditors or stockholders,49 but rather
in a Chapter XI composition or extension with creditors with additional
expense and delay. It would therefore appear that the application of the
"fair and equitable" doctrine resulted in this borderline case turning into
a "fair and practical" case in the best interests of creditors;co and that
the standards of sound discretion were more exactly defined by Justice
Frankfurter in the dissent in the General Stores case?'
45. Id. at 514.
46. The history of the development of the Liberty case in Chapter X has yet to be
written.
47. Daily News Record, May 17, 1957, p. 29, col. 1.
48. "[U]nsecured creditors are now offered the equivalent of 40 p2r cent of their
claims in full satisfaction." 350 U.S. at 465.
49. Cf. In re Camp Packing Co., 146 F. Supp. 935 (N.D.N.Y. 1956), citing SEC v.
United States Realty and Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434, 452 (1940), as to the distinction
between the objectives of a Chapter X and Chapter XI proceeding.
50. Cf. Bankruptcy Act § 366(2), 11 U.S.C.A. § 766(2) (Supp. 1956), which requires
the court to be satisfied that a plan is "for the best interests of creditors... 1" Cf. alho
Adler v. Jones, 109 Fed. 967 (6th Cir. 1901) which held that in Chapter XI proceeding
creditors must not receive considerably less than they would upon a liquidation of the
assets.
51. See page 296 supra.
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